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The Children’s Health Fund (CHF) and the National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) 
at the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University acknowledge the on-going work 
and contributions of the Congressionally established National Commission on Children and 
Disasters (NCCD) whose purpose is to independently examine and assess the needs of children in 
relation to the preparation for, response to and recovery from all-hazards, including major 
disasters and emergencies. 
 
Katrina: Five-Year Status Report on Children 
 
 
  1 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
It is estimated that in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 29th, 
2005 and was followed a month later by Hurricane Rita, approximately 1.5 million people, 
including some 163,000 children were displaced in Louisiana and Mississippi alone.  
Since children and families who had the means fled the city, those who were left were often the 
poorest and most vulnerable. These populations became the most dependent on the government’s 
efforts to help in the recovery process, and were the most affected when those efforts were less 
than sufficient. Those who previously had been marginalized and underserved were now faced 
with an unfathomably steep slope to climb in gaining access to resources. In the months after the 
storms, obstacles to health care became entrenched through the combination of facility closures 
and shortages of health care providers. In addition, federal disaster case management initiatives, 
which were meant to help victims access recovery resources, were slow to start and lacked both 
the comprehensiveness and continuity that were needed. To make matters worse, many of these 
case management programs were terminated prior to resolving challenges facing families and 
without making appropriate arrangements for satisfactory follow-up. 
Five years following the disasters of 2005, there have been significant signs of economic, 
infrastructural, and educational recovery in the Gulf. However, there are still serious shortfalls in 
certain areas of human recovery, particularly regarding mental health and housing stability. 
Compounding the remaining needs from the hurricanes, the region is now facing a man-made 
disaster—the aftermath of the BP oil spill. Identifying, assessing and providing professional 
assistance to children still in need remains an unmet challenge with highly worrisome 
consequences for the future. But most importantly, the affected families need urgent assistance to, 
five years after Katrina, return to a state of "normalcy". 
Immediately after Katrina, Children’s Health Fund (CHF) responded to the vital health needs of 
the Gulf Coast by establishing Operation Assist in collaboration with the National Center for 
Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) at the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University. 
As part of this project, CHF dispatched mobile medical units to provide disaster relief health 
services, which eventually led to the creation of three permanent CHF pediatric programs in the 
Gulf region. This collaboration also included a longitudinal cohort study, the Gulf Coast Child 
and Family Health Study (G-CAFH), which was designed to track the progress of a representative 
population of severely-impacted Gulf families over the ensuing years. The findings from the most 
recent G-CAFH surveys are included in this paper as well as on the ground anecdotal information 
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KEY FINDINGS 
 
 60% of children displaced by Katrina to congregate settings, such as trailer parks or 
hotels, either have serious emotional disorders, behavioral issues, and/or are 
experiencing significant housing instability.  We believe that this represents at least 20,000 
children who are affected. 
 
 Children displaced by Katrina were 4.5 times more likely to have symptoms consistent 
with serious emotional disturbance (SED) than did comparable children surveyed in a 2004 
national study. 
 
 Among those parents who thought their children needed professional help for these problems, 
slightly more than half did not receive it.  
 
 After four and a half years, nearly half the households who had been displaced for at least 
one year after the hurricane were still living in unstable conditions—either in transient 
housing or in other circumstances that couldn’t guarantee them a place to live for more than a 
year. 
 
 34% of middle or high school-age children were one or more years older than 
appropriate for their grade in school. This is compared to 19% of all children in the south. 
 
 Over one-third of parents living within ten miles of the coast line reported that their 
children had experienced either physical symptoms or mental health distress as a 





1. Increased and enhanced mental health services must be made immediately available to 
children still in need in the Gulf region.  Government will need to act boldly to secure the 
workforce necessary to treat this critical need. 
 
2. Rapid return to stable, secure and safe housing, must be given the highest priority in 
order to minimize the negative consequences to vulnerable children of prolonged uncertainty 
and housing instability.  
 
3. Appropriate support for parents or other caregivers must be available immediately and 
throughout the recovery process in order that they may focus on family resiliency. Resilient 
parents are the key to protecting children during times of instability and trauma. 
 
4. Three basic lessons from Katrina regarding disaster case management should be 
implemented as part of future federal disaster response and recovery plans: 
 
 Infrastructure and procedures must be in place to properly collect information about 
victims of a disaster and to ensure that they are tracked and monitored. 
 
 Case management services must be provided to victims of disaster in a comprehensive 
and continuous manner until recovery is complete.  
 
 Critical resources and services must be made available for victims of a disaster until 
all health and mental health needs have been appropriately addressed.  
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BACKGROUND 
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, the levees that protected the city of 
New Orleans were breached and 80% of the city was flooded, destroying housing, schools, 
businesses and health care agencies. The damage was compounded a month later when Hurricane 
Rita made landfall. These storms affected a significant portion of the Gulf Coast where it was 
estimated that approximately 1.5 million people, including some 163,000 children in Mississippi 
and Louisiana alone, were initially displaced by the storms. These children were often 
evacuated to other states and frequently experienced multiple moves from one transitional 
housing situation to another.  
By 2007, two years after Katrina, about 55% of school-age children had returned to their home 
state but were not necessarily in stable housing. It has been consistently difficult to estimate and 
track the number of families and children who were placed in various types of shelters, including 
small travel trailers, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In December 
2007 one estimate stated that as many as 64,900 children were still displaced and were at 
risk for poor health, mental health, and academic outcomes because of these experiences.1 It 
has been argued that the nature of shelters, their isolation from schools and other typical aspects 
of community, and the slow pace of recovery contributed to the mental health and academic 
problems of these Katrina evacuees.2  
The extensive infrastructural damage to New Orleans and other affected areas included the 
destruction of health services. In the aftermath of the storms, three-quarters of New Orleans’ 
safety net clinics were closed, and as a result, the primary care system for families living below 
the poverty line disappeared. For children, especially in New Orleans, the slow recovery of their 
everyday surroundings (delays restoring housing, schools, healthcare facilities, and rebuilding 
affected neighborhoods) exacerbated the impact of the disaster and undermined family and 
community supports that promote resilience and recovery.3 
Since children and families who had the means fled the city, those who were left were often the 
poorest and most vulnerable. These populations became the most dependent on the government’s 
efforts to help in the recovery process, and were the most affected when those efforts were less 
than sufficient. Those who previously had been marginalized and underserved were now faced 
with an unfathomably steep slope to climb in gaining access to resources. In the months after the 
storms, obstacles to care became entrenched through the combination of facility closures and 
shortages of health care providers. The result was that many who were most in need of health and 
mental health services after the storms did not have access to care.  
CURRENT STATUS  
Five years later, there have been significant signs of recovery in the Gulf region, for example, in 
economic restoration, critical infrastructure rebuilding and home repairs. Just one year after 
Katrina, employment levels rebounded close to the pre-storm levels in Mississippi and exceeded 
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pre-storm levels in Louisiana.4 And the average wages in greater New Orleans have grown by 
nearly 14% in the last five years, catching up to the national average for the first time since the 
mid-1980s, and though the poverty rate in the city remains high, at 23%, it is the lowest rate since 
at least 1979. In addition, the worst of our nation’s economic recession was buffered in the 
coastal region by rigorous post-Katrina recovery initiatives, resulting in unemployment levels that 
were lower than the national rates.5 Of the 1.1 million evacuees across the Gulf (including 
Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi), the 84% that returned have shown higher labor 
force participation rates than those that did not.6 
Local governments have made significant investments and gains in addressing housing damage 
for homeowners as part of the recovery: however, for renters, finding stable, affordable housing 
continues to be an issue. In New Orleans, rental costs are up 41% compared to pre-Katrina levels 
and the poor are disproportionately hurt by these increased rental costs. In Metro New Orleans, 
nearly half of full-time workers earn less than $35,000 a year, and 86% of households at that 
income level are financially burdened by the cost of housing. The Louisiana Recovery Authority 
(LRA) reports that the state has spent $13.4 billion of U.S. Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) Community Development Block Grant funding on infrastructure, including housing and 
economic development. Through the “Road Home,” the largest of these Block Grant programs, 
more than 120,000 Louisiana homeowners have received aid payments to help rebuild their 
homes. And although over 6,000 rental units were created through this program, only about two-
thirds were reserved as affordable housing, not nearly the adequate amount to meet the need.7  So 
even as more apartments become available, many are not affordable by the city’s residents.8  
In the areas of Mississippi affected by the storms, the supply of affordable housing has also fallen 
below projections of what is needed. By June 2009, the state had spent far more housing dollars 
for assistance to home owners than for income-targeted housing programs including public 
housing.9 In their January 2010 report on the use of disaster recovery assistance funds in 
Louisiana and Mississippi, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that assistance 
was provided for 62% of damaged homes compared to 18% of damaged rental units.10  
Data regarding student achievement for storm affected regions in the Gulf show a striking 
improvement. This is especially evident in New Orleans, where academic outcomes are better 
than ever and standardized test scores (“LEAP”) are higher. The student population is still only 
55% of what it was before Katrina, but the public education system has been restructured to 
include charter schools and the Recovery School District—fifty-one of the 88 schools, serving 
61% of students are now charter schools.11 There continues to be an achievement gap between 
New Orleans students and those in Louisiana as a whole, but this gap is narrowing. For example, 
before Katrina the average fourth grade language arts test scores in New Orleans were 25 
percentage points below the state level; in 2009 it was only 13 points lower.12  That said, the G-
CAFH study results report that 34% of middle or high school-age children that were one or more 
years older than appropriate for their grade in school. This is compared to 19% of all children in 
the South. 
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Yet despite all the successful rebuilding, there remain serious 
shortfalls in certain areas of human recovery, particularly in 
terms of mental health. A startling 60% of children 
displaced by Katrina either have serious emotional 
disorders, behavioral issues, and/or are experiencing 
significant housing instability.  We believe that this 
represents at least 20,000 children who are so affected—and 
perhaps considerably more.  It should be noted that some of 
these children may have experienced these conditions even if 
Katrina had never occurred, but in many cases, their situations 
were aggravated and/or prolonged by the trauma of disaster 
and a very difficult recovery period.  





Unstably housed + emotionally distressed
Unstably housed without emotional distress
Emotionally distressed, in stable housing
Stably housed, no emotional distress
 
Compounding the remaining need from Katrina, the region is 
now facing a man-made disaster in the aftermath of the BP oil 
spill. According to a survey of coastal residents conducted by 
NCDP in collaboration with CHF working with Marist 
Institute for Public Opinion, over one-third of parents living 
within ten miles of the coast line reported that their children 
had experienced either physical symptoms or mental health 
distress as a consequence of the spill.13  
Identifying, assessing and providing professional 
assistance to these 20,000 or more children remains an 
unmet challenge with highly worrisome consequences for 
the future. But most importantly, the affected families need 




The New Orleans Children’s 
Health Project (NOCHP), a 
partnership with Tulane 
University School of Medicine, 
began as a disaster relief 
program in 2005 and has 
subsequently become part of the 
city’s health care safety net, 
including mental health services. 
The NOCHP has totaled 42,607 
primary care and mental health 
visits and community outreach 
encounters since Katrina. 
Children with SED receiving 
treatment from NOCHP had 
experienced significant traumatic 
exposures during and after the 
hurricane, including long stays in 
mass shelters without adequate 
food and water, walking through 
waist-deep water and seeing 
dead bodies, and protracted 
separations from family. Reports 
of behavioral history consistent 
with SED were common, 
sometimes including extreme 
behavior such as animal cruelty 
and fire-setting. While housing 
and neighborhood conditions 
improved over time, the 
problems of children with 
psychiatric disorders remained 
steady in New Orleans. Some 
children with extreme behavior, 
such as suicidal or homicidal 
ideation, had returned to New 
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G-CAFH STUDY: THE LONG TERM EFFECTS OF KATRINA ON KIDS 
 
In 2005, immediately after Katrina, CHF responded to the 
urgent health and public health needs of the Gulf Coast by 
establishing Operation Assist in collaboration with NCDP. As 
part of this project, CHF sent mobile medical units from its 
national network of pediatric programs to provide disaster 
relief health services in the region. Over time this led to the 
creation of three permanent CHF Child Health Projects in 
New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast. 
This collaboration also included a longitudinal cohort study, 
the Gulf Coast Child and Family Health Study (G-CAFH), 
which was designed to track the progress of a representative 
population of displaced, homeless, or otherwise greatly-
impacted Louisiana and Mississippi families over the ensuing 
years.  
The G-CAFH study is an ongoing research effort conducted 
by NCDP in partnership with CHF and researchers at the 
Louisiana State University School of Public Health. Using 
lists provided by FEMA, the researchers randomly sampled 
households at trailer parks, hotels, and within census block 
areas particularly hard hit by the hurricane (this last strategy 
was adopted only in Mississippi).  Interviewers conducted 
face-to-face interviews with adult respondents in the 1,079 
randomly-sampled households.  New interviews with the 
population have been conducted annually since the baseline 
interviews (initially at 6-12 months after the hurricane, then 
beginning at 23, 36, and 54 months post-disaster), with the 
most recent set between November 2009 and March 2010.  
Over the first five years of the G-CAFH study, the research 
team has seen improvements in children’s access to medical 
care, the quality of that care, and other aspects of their lives 
and well-being. Still, mental health has proven to be an 
enduring and persistent problem. The study has therefore also 
focused on the importance of support systems in people’s 
lives, in particular their informal social support networks and 
characteristics of the communities in which they are living.  
 
Baton Rouge 
The Baton Rouge Children’s 
Health Project (BRCHP) was the 
major health care provider to 
children in “Renaissance Village,” 
the largest of the FEMA “trailer 
parks” and one of the sites 
included in the G-CAFH study 
cohort. The BRCHP, a partnership 
with Louisiana State University 
Health Science Center 
Pediatrics Department, has 
totaled 34,179 primary care and 
mental health visits and 
community outreach encounters 
since Katrina. A review of BRCHP 
medical charts in mid-2008 
captures some of the health 
problems of the children who 
remained in the FEMA trailers. 
Although by this time it was a 
small number, we found that 
more than one-third, 35%, had 
been referred for mental health 
and case management services. 
As of June 2010, the BRCHP was 
serving very few New Orleans 
evacuees; however, serious 
mental health problems 
continued to be identified among 
children in the East Baton Rouge 
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The NCDP research team has measured children’s mental health status in a variety of ways—by 
asking parents and caregivers whether their children have experienced emotional or behavioral 
difficulties that have developed since the hurricane; by asking the adults whether their children 
had received a clinical diagnosis of mood, anxiety, or behavioral disorder since the hurricane; and 
by administering a set of questions to parents that screens for “Serious Emotional Disturbance” 
(SED). The term “SED” is used in federal statutes to describe children and youth with a 
diagnosable psychiatric disorder that “severely disrupts” social, academic, and emotional 
functioning. For this, the researchers used the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire, a 
validated behavioral screening questionnaire that assesses emotional symptoms and problems of 
conduct, hyperactivity/inattention, peer relationship and prosocial behavior.14  
 
Recent G-CAFH findings (N=427) about the stressors facing children include:  
60% 
of children displaced to congregate settings such as FEMA trailer parks or hotels by 
Katrina either have serious emotional disorders, behavioral issues, and/or are experiencing 
significant housing instability.  We believe that this represents at least 20,000 children who 
are so affected. 
52% 
of parents who thought their children needed professional help for these problems, but did 
not receive it. The major reasons cited for not receiving mental health care were:  not 
knowing where to go, insurance that wouldn’t cover the service, no available providers, no 
available transportation, and no child care for other children in the household. 
50% of households who had been displaced for at least one year after the hurricane and were still living in unstable conditions after four and a half years —either in transient housing or 
in other circumstances that couldn’t guarantee them a place to live for more than a year.  
45% 
of parents that said their children were experiencing emotional or psychological problems 
that they did not have prior to Katrina. In addition, according to parents and caregivers, 
since Katrina, over one-third of children in the study have been clinically diagnosed at least 
once with a mood, anxiety or behavioral disorder.  
40% 
of parents that thought that their children were sometimes or always unsafe in their 
community, which is over twice the rates reported by parents in Louisiana and Mississippi 
prior to the hurricane, and nearly 30% reported that their children were sometimes or 
always unsafe in their schools, also twice as high as pre-storm averages in those states. 
36% 
of children that met criteria for SED15. By comparison, national rates for school-age 
children and youth are 5% to 9%.16 Controlling for children’s age, race, health insurance, 
household income, and region of the country, children in the cohort were 4.5 times more 
likely to have symptoms consistent with SED than did comparable children surveyed in a 
2004 national health study.17 
34% of middle or high school-age G-CAFH children that were one or more years older than 
appropriate for their grade in school. This is compared to 19% of all children in the South. 
7% of children that were still homeless and living in a trailer or in a hotel.  
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ON-THE-GROUND EXPERIENCE CONSISTENT WITH THE G-CAFH STUDY 
 
Medical charts for children served by CHF’s New Orleans, 
Baton Rouge, and Mississippi Gulf Coast Projects were 
reviewed and found evidence that many patients in the CHF 
Gulf Coast pediatric population have been affected by the 
storm as described in the G-CAFH study. The long-term 
effects from Hurricane Katrina have taken a significant mental 
health toll on children and their families. See side bars for 
details. 
It must be noted that baseline mental health data are not 
available. In turn, inferring a causal relationship between 
psychiatric disorders and traumatic exposures related to 
Hurricane Katrina is problematic. However, children in 
families with incomes at or below the poverty level, children 
with mental health disorders, children who’ve been exposed to 
domestic and community violence, are at higher risk for post-
disaster stress reactions.18 The eligibility standard for disaster 
mental health (“crisis counseling”) services is that the mental 
health condition be “caused or aggravated” by the disaster and 
its aftermath.19 There is no question that the children in the 
three CHF Gulf coast pediatric programs meet that criterion. 
Mississippi Gulf Coast  
At the Mississippi Gulf Coast 
Children’s Health Project 
(MGCCHP), many of the children 
were from counties that were 
hard hit by Hurricane Katrina. 
The MGCCHP, a partnership with 
Coastal Family Health Center, 
has totaled 57,472 primary care 
and mental health visits and 
community outreach encounters 
since the hurricane. Children 
with SED had been at high risk 
before Hurricane Katrina, and 
their disaster experience, which 
often included loss of home and 
extensive loss of property 
followed by long periods of 
homelessness and transient 
shelter placements, exacerbated 
previously-existing emotional 
problems and family dysfunction. 
Many of the seriously 
emotionally-disturbed children 
did not complete treatment 
because of psychosocial issues 
(family dysfunction, unstable 
housing situation, etc.). FEMA-
provided shelters such as trailers 
were considered by some 
families to be so unacceptable 
that they chose to return to 




STATUS OF FEDERAL CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS  
When Katrina hit the Gulf in 2005, disaster case management services were not part of the federal 
disaster response policy, as determined by the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act. Comprehensive disaster case management involves helping victims to identify their service 
needs and then access services and programs to fulfill those needs. A quality program can help 
mitigate the long-term effects of a disaster by helping children and their families find stable 
housing, schooling, and regular health and mental health services.  
In 2006, Congress attempted to address the lack of federal case management provisions with the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act which made disaster case management a 
formal responsibility of the federal government. Following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav and 
Ike, several federally-initiated disaster case management programs were implemented in the Gulf 
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region, including Katrina Aid Today, Disaster Housing Assistance Program, HHS Disaster Case 
Management Pilot Project, and the FEMA Disaster Case Management Pilot Program. A 
summary of these case management programs from the RAND Technical Report commissioned 
by the Louisiana Recovery Authority appears on the following page. 20  
The set-up and implementation of these different programs had widely varying degrees of 
success. An assessment of the Disaster Case Management Pilot Program in Louisiana conducted 
by RAND found that more than half of the cases remained open when the program was 
discontinued and that the needs of a majority of clients with closed cases had not been not 
fully met.21 As mentioned previously, children and families that were most in need of the 
government’s help on the road to recovery were often most vulnerable prior to the storms.  
The premature termination of case management services is particularly relevant when looking at 
the pattern of persistent instability that is evident in the results of the G-CAFH study. Four years 
after the storms, 60% of respondents characterized their situations as worse than before Katrina, 
and nearly half the families remained in unstable housing conditions. As recently as the period 
between November 2009 and March 2010, 7% of children originally displaced by the storm were 
still living in a trailer or hotel. But most significant was that approximately 45% of surveyed 
parents said that their children continued to experience emotional or psychological problems that 
they did not have before Katrina, and barely half received help for these problems.   
It is clear that more comprehensive and continuous case management services could have helped 
clients find stable housing, mental health services, and the resources that would have enabled 
them to utilize these services, such as transportation and child care. If this had been achieved, the 
number of children still suffering because of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita would be significantly 
less. The stories of success—for example, children whose families relocated to areas with good 
schools and achieved stability in those locations22—demonstrate the kind of stability that a 
comprehensive case management program should facilitate and the shortcomings of the programs 
that were implemented for Katrina and Rita victims.  
 
Disaster Case Management Programs Following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike, 2005-2010 
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U.S. Department of 








Victims of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita 
 
37,000 households 
Cora Brown Bridge April 2008 – May 
2008 


















Texas Individuals affected by 
Hurricane Ike 
16,589 households 









Mississippi Households affected  
by Hurricanes Katrina 











HHS Catholic Charities 
USA 
Louisiana Households affected  
by Hurricanes Gustav 
and Ike in Louisiana 
 
7,550 households 




LRA Louisiana state 
government 
Louisiana Households affected  
by Hurricanes Katrina 





SOURCES: Berman and Abe (2007); Catholic Charities USA (undated); GAO (2009); personal communication from FEMA to the lead author (May 3, 2010); the 
authors’ secondary analysis of the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN) case management data from the Louisiana DCMP; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (2009); Zimmerman (2009) 
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PUBLIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
CHF and NCDP have long urged both federal and state lawmakers to address the critical recovery 
needs of children in a comprehensive and immediate way. The following are key policy 
recommendations that build on previous proposals put forth by CHF and NCDP. It is imperative 
that policymakers act now to prevent further long-term damage to the children affected by 
Katrina, and that they apply what has been learned to improve disaster response efforts going 
forward. In addition, it should be noted that the below recommendations are consistent with those 
made by the National Commission on Children and Disasters (NCCD).23 
1. Increased and enhanced mental health services must be made available to children still 
in need in the Gulf region. Our findings clearly indicate an urgent need to identify the 
children in the Gulf who continue to suffer mental health problems. These children must be 
provided appropriate treatment and follow-up services, and the federal government must 
accept unambiguous responsibility for helping those in the Gulf achieve a full recovery from 
Katrina and subsequent hurricanes. The federal government also must ensure that the 
recovery resources provided to Louisiana and Mississippi are sufficient to guarantee the 
capacity to provide needed mental health services. It should be acknowledged that this goal 
will not be easily achieved, as there already was a lack of available mental health providers, 
especially for impoverished children and families, in the Gulf region prior to the storms and 
Katrina only exacerbated this problem. Although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, the recently passed health reform legislation, includes incentives to attract health 
providers to shortage areas, the benefits from this law will not be seen immediately; therefore 
the federal and state governments will need to act swiftly and boldly to secure the workforce 
necessary to respond to this critical need. 
2. Action must be taken by the federal and state governments to ensure that a rapid return to 
stable, secure and safe housing, is given the highest priority in order to minimize the 
negative consequences to vulnerable children of prolonged uncertainty and housing 
instability.  
3. Action must be taken by the federal and state governments to ensure appropriate support 
for parents or other caregivers are available immediately and until optimal recovery is 
achieved so that they may focus on a return to normalcy for their kids. Resilient parents are 
the key to protecting children during times of instability and trauma. 
4. Going forward, there are three basic lessons learned about disaster case management from 
Katrina that should be implemented as part of future federal disaster response and recovery 
efforts: 
 Infrastructure and procedures must be in place to properly collect information 
about children and families affected by disaster and to ensure that they are tracked 
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and monitored. Information about victims of disaster must be collected to ensure that 
they can be appropriately served by public agencies and service organizations 
participating in recovery efforts. Federal and state agencies involved in the recovery 
efforts need to document, coordinate, and track information regarding where the families 
are going and what is happening to them.  
 Case management services must be provided to victims of disaster in a 
comprehensive and consistent manner until recovery is complete. In October of 2009, 
CHF hosted Disaster Case Management in Louisiana: A Roundtable on Recovery from 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav and Ike. This roundtable event brought together key 
disaster case management stakeholders, including representatives from federal agencies, 
providers and advocates for disaster case management services, and interested parties 
from academia, the private sector, and foundations. Following this event, a report was 
issued that summarized the challenges faced by federal case management programs after 
Katrina and included specific policy recommendations, supported by CHF, NCDP, and 
other organizations, for improving federal disaster case management programs. As the 
federal government moves forward with its efforts to improve disaster case management 
programs, these detailed recommendations should be implemented.24 In addition, the 
NCCD has issued a comprehensive report on children and disasters which covers a 
variety of areas, including disaster case management.25 Finally, the federal Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Resources Administration (SAMHSA) has issued specific 
guidance for mental health preparedness planning to supplement the general disaster 
preparedness guidance previously issued by FEMA.26 The information and 
recommendations in these documents should be taken into account by policymakers as 
federal disaster case management policies and programs are amended. 
 Critical resources and services must be made available for victims of a disaster until 
all health and mental health needs have been appropriately addressed. Effective case 
management for all families is the key to moving forward, but even the most effective 
case management programs cannot be successful without the guarantee of appropriate 
resources. Part of the federal response and recovery efforts should be to help ensure that 
they are available without interruption or delay. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast region was illustrative of the crippling effect 
of vulnerability. To a very large extent the directly-affected population was at the highest risk for 
problems relating to disaster trauma.  The children and youth considered most vulnerable for 
serious post-disaster stress reactions are poor, minority, living in unsafe neighborhoods, attending 
underachieving schools, and in families that are having difficulty coping with financial issues and 
other types of stress.  
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Elevated rates of mental health and case management needs, diagnosed psychiatric disorders, and 
symptoms consistent with serious emotional disturbance reflect a confluence of factors peculiar to 
Hurricane Katrina, and specifically demonstrate that the disaster’s most direct impact was 
experienced primarily by medically underserved and extremely impoverished communities. 
Because of their conditions prior to the storm, these populations were highly dependent on the 
government’s response and recovery initiatives, which were insufficient from the start. 
Our experience post-Hurricane Katrina has made it apparent that following a natural disaster, in 
addition to short-term needs there may be long-term needs, including the need for mental health 
and case management services, especially for poor and vulnerable populations. Therefore, it is 
imperative that federal disaster response includes the ability to collect information about disaster 
victims and the ability to track and monitor their recovery. It also must include comprehensive 
and continuous case management services, and the appropriate resources that will allow case 
management to be effective. Lessons learned from Katrina provide an enormous opportunity for 
the federal government to improve its disaster response and recovery, specifically as it relates to 























                                                                                                                                                 
1 David Abramson, Irwin Redlener, Tasha Stehling-Ariza, Elizabeth Fuller. National Center for Disaster 
Preparedness, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health. The Legacy of Katrina’s Children: 
Estimating the Numbers of Hurricane-Related At-Risk Children in the Gulf Coast States of Louisiana and 
Mississippi. NCDP Research Brief 2007_12. December 2007. Online at: 
http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/files/legacy_katrina_children.pdf 
 
2 Paula Madrid, Roy Grant, Rachel Rosen. Creating Disability through Inadequate Disaster Response: 
Hurricane Katrina and its Aftermath. Chapter in: Disability: Insights from Across Fields and Around the 
World. Volume 2, pages 1-16. Portsmouth NH: Praeger Press. 2009. 
 
3 Howard J Osofsky, Joy D Osofsky, Mindy Kronenberg, Adrianne Brennan, Tonya Cross. Posttraumatic 
stress symptoms in children after Hurricane Katrina: Predicting the need for mental health services. 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. 2009; 79: 212-220. 
 
4 The RAND Gulf States Policy Institute. The Workforce and Economic Recovery: Effects of Hurricane 
Katrina. Research Brief. June 2010. Online at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9531.pdf 
 
5 Amy Liu, Allison Pleyer. The New Orleans Index at Five: An Overview of Greater New Orleans From 
Recovery to Transformation. Brookings Institution. August 2010. Online at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/08neworleansindex/08neworleansindex.pdf  
 
6 The RAND Gulf States Policy Institute. The Workforce and Economic Recovery: Effects of Hurricane 
Katrina. Research Brief. June 2010. Online at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9531.pdf 
 
7 Louisiana Recovery Authority. More than $10.3 Billion in Federal Recovery Funds Invested in 
Recovering a Safer and Stronger Louisiana in the Wake of Four Massive Hurricanes. Press Release. June 
24, 2010. Online at: 
http://lra.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=627&printer=1  
 
8 A Plyer. Demographic and Housing Trends in the New Orleans Metro. Greater New York Community 
Data Center and Urban Institute. April 2010. Online at: 
http://www.housingonline.com/Documents/A%20Plyer%20April%207%202010.pdf  
 
9 The Steps Coalition. Hurricane Katrina: Has Mississippi Fallen Further Behind? Trends and challenges in 
Mississippi’s Disaster Recovery. Updated September 24, 2009. Online at: 
http://www.stepscoalition.org/downloads/news/headlines/k+4_report.pdf  
 
10 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO).  Disaster Assistance: Federal Assistance for 
Permanent Housing Primarily Benefited Homeowners; Opportunities Exist to Better Target Rental Housing 
Needs. GAO-10-17. January 2010. Online at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1017.pdf  
 
11 Cowen Institute for Public Education Initiatives, Tulane University. The State of Public Education in 
New Orleans Five Years After Hurricane Katrina. July, 2010 Report. Online at: 
http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/katrina-book.final_.CIpageSmaller.pdf  
 
12 Southern Education Foundation. New Orleans Schools Four Years after Katrina: A Lingering Federal 
Responsibility. Online at: http://www.southerneducation.org/pdf/NOSchools-report-pre-pub.pdf  
 
13 National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health and 
Children’s Health Fund. Impact on Children and Families of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Preliminary 
Findings of the Coastal Population Impact Study. 2010. Online at: 
http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/files/NCDP_Oil_Impact_Report.pdf, Better URL: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:9416 




                                                                                                                                                 
 
14 SDQ: Information for researchers and professionals about the Strengths & Difficulties Questionnaires. 
Online at: http://www.sdqinfo.org/  
 
15 Abramson D, Stehling-Ariza T, Park YS, Redlener I (2010). Children as Bellwethers of Recovery. 
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness (in press). 
 
16 Health and Human Services, Office of the U.S. Surgeon General. Mental Health: A Report of the 
Surgeon General. 1999. Online at: 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2_1.html#footnote4  
 
17 Independent analysis by D Abramson et al. of data from the 2004 National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS), administered annually by the U.S. Census Bureau and used to track health status and health care 
access of the U.S. population. Details of the NHIS are online at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/brochure2010January.pdf . 
 
18 Andrew Garrett, Roy Grant, Paula Madrid, Arturo Brito, David Abramson, Irwin Redlener. Children and 
Megadisasters: Lessons Learned in the New Millennium. Advances in Pediatrics. 2007; 54: 191-214. 
 
19 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance act, as amended, and Related Authorities. 
Section 416. June 2007. FEMA 592. Online at: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/stafford_act.pdf.  
 
20 Joie Acosta, Anita Chandra, Kevin Carter Feeney. Navigating the Road to Recovery: Assessment of the 
Coordination, Communication, and Financing of the Disaster Case Management Pilot in Louisiana. 
Technical Report. RAND Health. 2010. Online at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR849.pdf  
 
21 Joie Acosta, Anita Chandra, Kevin Carter Feeney. Navigating the Road to Recovery: Assessment of the 
Coordination, Communication, and Financing of the Disaster Case Management Pilot in Louisiana. 
Technical Report. RAND Health. 2010. Online at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR849.pdf 
 
22 John F Payne, Daniel F McCaffrey Nidhi Kalra, Annie J Zhou. Effects of student displacement in 
Louisiana during the first academic year after the Hurricanes of 2005. Journal of Education for Students 
Placed at Risk. 2008; 13: 168-211. 
 
23 National Commission on Children and Disasters: Interim Report. October 14, 2009. Online at: 
http://www.childrenanddisasters.acf.hhs.gov/20091014_508IR_partII.pdf; Progress Report on Children and 
Disasters. May 11, 2010. Online at: 
http://www.childrenanddisasters.acf.hhs.gov/20100511_NCCD_Progress_Report_FINAL.pdf 
 
24 Children’s Health Fund. Reforming Disaster Case Management: National Lessons Learned from 
Louisiana. December 2009. 
 
25 National Commission on Children and Disasters: Interim Report. October 14, 2009. Online at: 
http://www.childrenanddisasters.acf.hhs.gov/20091014_508IR_partII.pdf; Progress Report on Children and 
Disasters. May 11, 2010.  Online at: 
http://www.childrenanddisasters.acf.hhs.gov/20100511_NCCD_Progress_Report_FINAL.pdf 
 
26 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA), Center for Mental Health Services. Mental Health All-Hazards Disaster 
Planning Guidance. 2003. Online at: http://download.ncadi.samhsa.gov/ken/pdf/SMA03-3829/All-
HazGuide.pdf  
 
